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Wales: Harmless Error and Misjoinder Under the Federal Rules of Criminal

NOTES
HARMLESS ERROR AND MISJOINDER UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
A NARROWING DIVISION OF OPINION
A primary purpose of rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,' which governs joinder of offenses and defendants in
federal criminal cases, is to balance each defendant's right to a fair
trial against the desire of the courts, the government, and the public for efficiency and economy in the judicial system. 2 The major
function of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 3
the harmless error rule, is similar. Errors not affecting the "substantial rights" 4 of a defendant should not cause retrial of cases
which have ended in conviction and which have cost vast amouhats
of effort, time, and the public's money.
Whether rule 52(a) should apply to cases in which offenses or
defendants are misjoined under rule 8, or whether, in fact, the
interaction of the two rules defeats the rationale for both is the
subject of this note. The federal courts of appeals are divided on
this issue and, despite numerous opportunities, the Supreme Court
has declined to resolve the matter. 5
1. FED. R. Clm. P. 8 provides:
(a) Joinder of Offenses.
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information
in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies
or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based
on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
(b) Joinder of Defendants.
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or
in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
2. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1960) (citing Daley v. United
States, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 964 (1956)).
3. FED. R. Cpim. P. 52(a) provides: "Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
4. Courts applying rule 52(a) to improper joinder under rule 8 have hesitated to
deal directly with what are "substantial rights" in the context of misjoinder. See text
accompanying notes 120-125 infra.
5. Courts find rule 52(a) inapplicable based primarily upon a finding of prej533
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Considered first are the background and application of rules 8
and 52(a) independent of one another. 6 The application of rule 52(a)
to joinder improper under rule 8 is then examined. The respective
positions of the courts are set out and criticized. Finally, closer
analysis of the decisions of several of the circuits finding rule 52(a)
inapplicable to misjoinder indicates what may be a trend in these
circuits toward expanding permissible joinder under rule 8 by defining its terms more broadly. This suggests further that the division between the circuits may in fact be narrowing: The more
broadly joinder rules are construed, the less likely misjoinder will
occur, and, equally, the less likely it is that the issue of harmless
error will even arise.
udice per se to a defendant forced to undergo a trial where either offenses or defendants were improperly joined under rule 8. This stance has been expressed most
recently by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658 (5th Cir, 1977):
"When unrelated transactions involving several defendants are joined together ..
[t]he result is an inherent prejudice that no form of limiting instructions or cautionary charge could absolve .. ." Id. at 662 (citations omitted). Accord, United States v.
Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marionneaux, 514
F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Graci, 504 F.2d 411, 413-14 (3d Cir.
1974); United States v. Bova, 493 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Reynolds, 489 F.2d 4, 6 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974); United
States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11, 14 (10th Cir. 1969); Chubet v. United States, 414
F.2d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir.
1967); Metheany v. United States, 365 F.2d 90, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1966); Cupo v. United
States, 359 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1013 (1967); King v.
United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1966); United States v. Spector, 326
F.2d 345, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1963); Ward v. United States, 289 F.2d 877, 878 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 570-71 (4th Cir. 1959). Even more
recently, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed the counterposition in United States v.
Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977):
It is well-settled in this circuit that the harmless error doctrine applies to
misjoinder of counts under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b) ... [Wihen evidence tending to prove the charge that should have been severed would nevertheless
have been admissible at the trial of the objecting codefendant, and was admitted subject to appropriate limiting instructions, any error was harmless.
Id. at 1061. Accord, United States v. Payden, 536 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971); Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958,
973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); United States v. Granello,
365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967).
6. The courts themselves have experienced great difficulty in determining rule
8's correct application: "None of the Federal Rules has given rise to so much misunderstanding." 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACCE 8.02 [1], at 8-2 (2d rev. ed. 1977). It
is this misunderstanding of rule 8 which triggers its misapplication, from which misjoinder many times results. The analysis which the courts bring to application of
rules 8 and 52(a) independent of one another is therefore central to understanding
any approach to the interaction of these rules.
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BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES

Joinder of Offenses and Defendants-Rule 8

The Advisory Committee notes to rule 8 indicate that the rule
is substantially a restatement of existing law. 7 Rule 8(a) is, as sug8
gested by the committee, substantially the same as its predecessor.
Rule 8(b), on the other hand, has no statutory basis, but rests on
judicial decision. 9
There is case law which indicates that joinder of offenses of the
same class against multiple defendants was permitted prior to the

adoption of the Federal Rules. 10 This, in conjunction with the Advisory Committee note, suggests that the drafters may have in-

tended rule 8 to perpetuate that practice. 1 However, following the

7. The Advisory Committee note to rule 8 states:
Note to Subdivision (a). This rule is substantially a restatement of existing
law, 18 U.S.C. former § 557 (Indictments and presentments; joinder of
charges) [now repealed].
Note to Subdivision (b). The first sentence of the rule is substantially a restatement of existing law, 9 Edmunds, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, 2d
Ed., 4116. The second sentence formulates a practice now approved in some
circuits, Caringella v. United States, 78 F.2d 563, 567, C.C.A. 7th.
8. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 1, 10 Stat. 162 (prior to amendment) (current
version at FED. R. Cmiu.
P. 8(a)) provides as follows:
Whenever there are or shall be several charges against any person or
persons for the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more acts or transactions of the same
class of crimes or offenses which may be properly joined, instead of having
several indictments, the whole may be joined in one indictment in separate
counts; and if tvo or more indictments shall be found in such cases, the
court may order them to be consolidated.
9. United States v. Bayaud, 16 F. 376, 386 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883). See Orfield,
Joinderin Federal CriminalProcedure,26 F.R.D. 23, 25 (1960-1961).
10. See United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 998 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 773 (1943). The court first stated that the "same class" language of the statute
preceding rule 8(a), see note 8 supra, "presupposes that the transactions may be
quite independent of each other." United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943). The court then stated: "The mere fact that the
accused are different in two counts is no longer important, despite what was said in
McElroy v. United States .... Id. (citation omitted). For a discussion of McElroy v.
United States, 164 U.S. 76 (1896), and related cases, see note 58 infra and accompanying text. See also 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 8.06[1], at 8-27 (2d rev. ed.
1977).
11. Professor Wright has reached the same conclusion. He indicates that the
drafters of rule 8 may well have intended rule 8(a) to be read in conjunction with
rule 8(b); once rule 8(b)'s requirements are met with respect to joinder of defendants, rule 8(a) indicates what offenses may be properly joined. This result, he
suggests, would be consistent with the pattern of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which the drafters seem to have used as their model. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 144, at 318-19 (1969). See FED. R. Civ. P. 18 & 20
(amended 1966), 28 U.S.C. app., at 6075, 6099, 6100 (1964), as they were prior to the
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adoption of rule 8, the great majority of courts, without significant
debate, have interpreted rules 8(a) and 8(b) as mutually exclusive;

rule 8(b) is to apply in cases of multiple defendants. 12 As indicated
below, 13 application of the harmless error rule to improper joinder

under rule 8 may effectively be to read rules 8(a) and 8(b) in conjunction with one another. In that event, debate as to whether the

drafters intended rule 8 to permit joinder of unrelated but similar
offenses against multiple defendants may finally have begun, some-

what belatedly and in the unexpected guise of whether rule 52(a)
should be applied to misjoinder.
Joinder of offenses with respect to single defendants is analyzed

under rule 8(a); 14 this analysis has never been seriously question1966 amendments. Professor Wright indicates, however, that he believes joinder of
offenses of the same or similar character should be "inapplicable to cases involving
multiple defendants." C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 144, at 319
(1969).
12. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 899 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971);
United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11, 14 (10th Cir. 1969); Cupo v. United States,
359 F.2d 990, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But see Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345,
346 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959); Kivette v. United States, 230
F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935 (1958).
13. See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
14. Before discussing the application of rule 8, it should be noted that FED. R.
CRIM. P. 13 & 14 also affect joinder and are relevant to this discussion. Rule 14
provides in pertinent part:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such
joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of
counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. It is well-settled that rule 14 only applies once a threshold
determination has been made that joinder is proper under rule 8. United States v.
Park, 531 F.2d 754, 760 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Graci, 504 F.2d 411, 413 (3d
Cir. 1974); Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 570 (4th Cir. 1959); Cataneo v.
United States, 167 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1948). The trial court determines motions
under rule 14 by balancing the prejudice to defendant inherent in a joint trial against
the expense and inconvenience to the Government of multiple trials. United States
v. Wallace, 272 F. Supp. 838, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Andreadis, 238 F.
Supp. 800, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Courts have historically been reluctant to grant relief under rule 14. 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.06[2], at 8-29 (2d rev. ed. 1977);
C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 222, at 436, § 223, at 446. See also Walsh, FairTrials and the
Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure,49 A.B.A.J. 853 (1963). Walsh has characterized
this reticence to grant relief under rule 14: "Rule 14 is entitled 'Relief from Prejudicial Joinder,' but might as well be entitled 'No Relief from Prejudicial Joinder' as now
construed." Id. at 856. For the defendant who goes to trial properly joined under
rule 8, the chances of receiving a separate trial at a later time are unlikely at the trial
level and even less likely on appeal; the trial court's decision is reversible only to
rectify clear abuse of discretion. Cataneo v. United States, 167 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir.
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ed. 15 Rule 8(a) provides for joinder in four situations. Offenses may
be joined under the rule if they are "of the same or similar character," stem from the "same act or transaction," from "acts or trans-

actions connected together," or from "a common scheme or plan.'16

Commentators have generally agreed with the latter three
provisions. 17 While individual courts may define such terms as
"transaction" and "connected together" broadly or narrowly,' 8
the only provision which has provoked serious disagreement is
that permitting joinder of offenses of the same or similar character. 19 The principal justifications for this provision are judicial

economy 20 and the argument that evidence of such offenses may be
admissible at a separate trial of the offense to which it is joined

under the "prior similar acts" or "other crimes" rule. 2 ' However,
joinder under this provision can easily result in the introduction of
evidence which fails to meet the "other crimes" test. 22 In such
1948). See also Orfield, Relief from PrejudicialJoinder in Federal Criminal Cases
(pt. 2), 36 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 495, 509-10 (1960). It is for this reason that the

courts' interpretation of rule 8 and what they first determine to be the bounds of
proper joinder are of central importance. A broad interpretation of rule 8 means
broad joinder. See text accompanying notes 126-166 infra. FED. R. CRIM. P. 13 pro-

vides:
The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to
be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than
one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
Consequently, the test for consolidation under rule 13 is whether all offenses and
defendants could have been joined initially under rule 8. Daley v. United States, 231
F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 964 (1956); Cataneo v. United States,
167 F.2d 820, 822 (4th Cir. 1948).
15. See United States v. Quinn, 365 F.2d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Welsh, 15 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D.D.C. 1953).
16. See note I supra.
17. See, e.g., 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.0512], at 8-19 (2d rev. ed. 1977);
C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 143, at 314-15; 74 YALE L.J. 553, 562 (1965).
18. See note 126 infra and accompanying text.
19. For discussions critical of the inclusion of rule 8(a) in the federal rules, see
C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 143, at 316-18; Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 23 ORE. L. REV. 56, 58 (1943) (criticizing then proposed "Rule
9(a)," since adopted as rule 8(a)).
20. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
21. 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 8.0512], at 8-20 (2d rev. ed. 1977). See
also Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The "other crimes"
rule is now embodied in FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
22. A classic illustration of the introduction of such evidence was presented in
Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Defendant was tried in a single
trial for two different robberies. The only similarities between the two robberies
were that they occurred at different branches of the same store and were committed
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cases, arguments of judicial efficiency are greatly weakened because the only substantial time saved by such joinder is the selection of one jury rather than two, a process that does not consume
much time in most cases. 2 3 Moreover, the defendant will almost
certainly be prejudiced by the joinder in one of several ways: (1)
The jury is apt to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the
24
defendant and convict him of the unrelated offenses because of it;
(2) the jury may convict based upon a cumulation of guilt from all
the offenses charged, which, when considered separately might not
have resulted in conviction; 25 (3) defendant may become confounded or embarrassed in presenting separate defenses; 26 or (4) the jury
may simply become confused in considering unrelated offenses
which are juxtaposed in a single trial.
These factors led to severe criticism of the rule prior to its
adoption 27 and have prompted at least one call for its abolition. 28
Such considerations are important for the present discussion because misjoinder of defendants under rule 8(b) often results from
a trial court's mistaken analysis of a rule 8(b) problem in rule 8(a)
2 9

termS.

Rule 8(b) need only be mentioned briefly here. Rule 8(b) permits joinder of multiple defendants only if "they are alleged to
have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses." 30
As indicated, in cases involving multiple defendants, the overwhelming majority of courts have held that rule 8(b) controls exclusively; rule 8(a) should not be considered. Offenses which are
similar but unrelated are not grounds for joinder of multiple defendants. 31
by a black man wearing sunglasses. In reversing defendant's conviction on grounds
of prejudicial joinder, the court stated: "These facts do not show such a close similarity ... as would make them admissible in separate trials." Id. at 92.
23. See 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 8.05[2], at 8-19 n.15 (2d rev. ed. 1977);
74 YALE L.J. 553, 560 (1965).
24. See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
25. Id.
26. Id. See also Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
27. See Maguire, supra note 19, at 58-59. See generally Orfield, supra note 9,
at 27-28.
28. See, e.g., 74 YALE L.J. 553, 560 (1965).
29. See King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1966).
30. See note 1 supra. For a discussion of the interpretation of these terms by
several circuits holding rule 52(a) not applicable to misjoinder under rule 8, see
text accompanying notes 126-166 infra.
31. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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Harmless Error-Rule 52(a)
The harmless error doctrine embodied in rule 52(a) 32 derives
from two statutes no longer in effect. 3 3 Section 391 provided that
on the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, or motion for a new trial
"the court shall give judgment . . . without regard to technical
errors . . . which do not effect the substantive rights of the parties." 34 Section 556 provided that no indictment should be deemed
insufficient or trial or judgment be affected "by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to
35
the prejudice of the defendant."
The language of these statutes emphasizes their limitation to
matters of form and technicality. The early cases so held. 3 6 There
was a general reticence to apply the doctrine more broadly; in fact,
in drafting section 269 of the Judicial Code,3 7 the predecessor of
the present rule, there was great hesitation in the Senate as to
whether the doctrine should be applied to criminal cases at all.38
32.
33.

See note 3 supra.
The Advisory Committee note to rule 52(a) states:

Note to Subdivision (a). This rule is a restatement of existing law, 28
U.S.C.A. former § 391 (second sentence): "On the hearing of any appeal,
certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record
before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties"; 18 U.S.C.A. former
§ 556: "No indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or
other court of the United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the
trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any
defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the
prejudice of the defendant, * * *." A similar provision is found in Rule 61
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., Appendix.
34. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 269, 36 Stat. 1163, as amended by Act of Feb.
26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, as amended by Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat.
54 (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)).
35. Act of May 18, 1933, ch. 31, 48 Stat. 58 (current version at FED. R. C(M. P.
52(a)).
36. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 615 (1946); Weiler v. United
States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 (1945); Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). Concerning § 269 of the Judicial Code, the Supreme Court stated in Bruno:
Suffice it to indicate, what every student of the history behind the Act of
February 26, 1919, knows, that that act was intended to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and
minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict. Of a very different order of importance is the right of an accused to insist on a privilege
which Congress has given him.
Id. at 294.
37. Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, § 269, 40 Stat. 1181 (current version at FED. R.
CraM. P. 52(a)).

38. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 (1946).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 533

Nevertheless, it was ultimately included as rule 52(a).
The difference in wording between rule 52(a) and its predecessors has not gone unnoticed by the courts: "The word difference
. . . is not great, but it is to be noted that the phrase 'technical
errors' has been deleted from the present law and the word 'errors'

substituted.- 39 Consequently, the doctrine embodied in the present law has evolved 40 from one governing "technical errors" and

"errors of form" to one which is now held applicable to errors
of all
kinds, including errors of constitutional dimension. 4 1
Yet, the courts have long had difficulty defining a precise

standard under which to apply the rule. 42 The test enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California4 3 with respect to
federal constitutional error is that the court must be able to "declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 44
However, while it seems that arguments for it could certainly be
made, no federal court has raised misjoinder to an error of constitutional dimension. 45 Matters are further complicated by the courts'
39. Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
986 (1967).
40. For a view of the thinking behind this evolution, see United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 642-64 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946); United States v. Bennett, 152 F.2d 342, 348-49 (2d Cir.
1945) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 663
(1946); United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 919-25 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945); United States v. Lekacos, 151 F.2d 170,
174 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd sub nom. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946);
Bollenbach v. United States, 147 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd, 326 U.S. 607
(1946); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944); United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995,
1001-05 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943); United
States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 923-24 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 308 U.S. 287 (1939); United
States v. Berger, 73 F.2d 278, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1934), rev'd, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). These
cases form part of a dialogue in the Second Circuit, principally between Judges
Learned Hand and Jerome Frank. This evolution seems to have been accepted de facto
by courts finding misjoinder under rule 8 harmless error. See text accompanying notes
121-125 infra.
41. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
42. See note 40 supra; text accompanying notes 121-125 infra.
43. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
44. Id. at 24.
45. A due process argument could be formulated here. However, such argument seems only to have been accepted in one case, where misjoinder was accompanied by the trial court's failure to give a proper cautionary charge. Moreover, this
case was reversed on appeal because defendants failed to make a timely objection to
the misjoinder. See Green v. Rundle, 303 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd, 452
F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971) (consolidation of indictments charging single defendant with
rape in one indictment and with assault and battery and resisting arrest, which were
unrelated to rape charge, in second).
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without
discussion of harmless error in the context of misjoinder
46
application.
rule's
the
defining any precise test for
The standard now applied in federal cases on review of errors
set forth by the Supreme
dimension is that
nonconstitutional
of
av

Court in Kotteakos v. United States:

If ... the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the
jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment
should stand . . . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance,
after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that sub... is ... whether
stantial rights were not affected. The inquiry
48
the error itself had substantial influence.
The impact of this shift, away from finding harmless only errors
of form, on rule 52(a)'s applicability to misjoinder under rule 8 has
not been explored by the courts. One effect of the shift is to focus
debate not upon whether misjoinder represents a merely technical error, but rather on whether improper joinder affects "substantial rights." The question thus becomes: What are "substantial
rights" in the context of rule 8? Yet, this question is one which the
49
courts have hesitated to approach directly.
THE INTERACTION OF RULES 8 AND 52(a)
Ingrain v. United States, 50 decided by the Fourth

Circuit, was
the seminal case refusing to apply rule 52(a) to misjoinder under
rule 8.51 Defendant Ingram was indicted with his wife, Clara, and
three other defendants, James Gill, Janie Gill, and Hozel Duke
for concealing and possessing nontaxpaid liquor. After the jury was
impaneled, the Ingrams moved for severance of their trial from
that of the Gills and Duke. The motion was denied 5 2 and the case
went to trial. 53 The evidence showed that on March 21, 1959,
46. See text accompanying notes 120-125 infra.
47. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
48. Id. at 764-65 (citation omitted).
49. See text accompanying notes 120-125 infra.
50. 272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959).
51. Id. at 570.
52. Id. at 568.
53. Id. at 567-68. The case was in fact somewhat more complicated. A second
indictment was involved. The indictment charging the Ingrams, the Gills, and Duke
arose out of events occurring on March 21, 1959. This indictment (No. 166) was
consolidated with a second indictment (No. 497) which stemmed from events occurring on November 26, 1958. The second indictment charged Ingrain and two defen-
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Ingram was seen carrying objects away from the woodshed in back
of his house. Shortly afterwards, the police apprehended Clara Ingram carrying a gallon of nontaxpaid whiskey away from the woodshed. Two more half-gallon jars of whiskey were found in the shed.
Simultaneously, at the Gills' house up the street, other police officers found Janie Gill in possession of nontaxpaid whiskey and
discovered fifty-six half gallons of the whiskey in a tool house behind the Gills' home. Beyond the fact that the police made these
seizures at the same time and that the houses were relatively
close together, there was no indication of any connection between the violations. At the close of testimony, Clara Ingram
changed her plea to guilty. The two Gills and Ingram were con54
victed.
On appeal Ingram contended, and the Government conceded,
that the joinder of defendants was improper. The Government argued, however, that even though there had been a misjoinder of
defendants, relief was in the discretion of the trial judge under rule
14 and denial of severance or of a new trial was not error unless
abuse of discretion was shown. The Government argued that, in
the absence of a showing of prejudice, rule 52(a) should apply.55
The Fourth Circuit first found that where joinder is prohibited
by rule 8(b), severance is mandatory5 6 and thus not a matter within
the discretion of the trial judge. The court then expounded what
has become the major rationale for holding rule 52(a) inapplicable in cases of misjoinder---courts' inability to determine the
extent to which defendant has been prejudiced. The court
examined the language of rule 8 permitting joinder, and inferred
the converse: "[Rule 8(b)] provides that two or more defendants
may be jointly charged if they are alleged to have participated in
the same act or transaction. The necessary inference from this is
that they may not be jointly indicted or tried in the absence of a

dants not charged in the first indictment, with offenses similar to those alleged in the
first. The only link between the two cases was that they both involved possession by
Ingram of nontaxpaid liquor. Id. at 571. While this consolidation was unquestionably improper and, in itself, would have been grounds for a new trial on thebasis of
McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76 (1896), the court relied instead on its finding
of misjoinder in No. 166, which it held to settle the issue as to No. 497 as well: "It
necessarily follows that case No. 497 should not have been consolidated with the
case against the Gills and Duke." Id.
54. Id. at 568.
55. Id. at 568-69.
56. Id. at 569-70.
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common act or transaction." 57 The reason, the court suggested,
that the trial judge has no discretion to allow joinder not permitted
under the rule stems from the impossibility of determining, even
retrospectively, that the defendant was not prejudiced by the misjoinder. The Fourth Circuit in Ingram quoted Chief Justice Fuller's
58
opinion for the Supreme Court in McElroy v. United States:
[J]oinder cannot be sustained where the parties are not the same
and where the offences are in nowise parts of the same transaction .... It cannot be said in such case that all the defendants
may not have been embarrassed and prejudiced in their defence,
or that the attention of the jury may not have been distracted to
their injury in passing upon distinct and independent transactions .... 59

Given this inability to establish the extent of the prejudice resulting from improper joinder, the Fourth Circuit found no choice
but to adopt a per se rule. "In other words," the court stated,
"where multiple defendants are charged with offenses in no way
connected, and are tried together, they are prejudiced by that very
fact .... "60
The court in Ingrain chose to emphasize, in addition, another
purpose of rule 8, the deterrence of "mass trials": 61

57. Id. at 569 (emphasis in original).
58. 164 U.S. 76 (1896). In McElroy five defendants were indicted for assault
and arson occurring on May 1, 1894. Three of them were separately indicted
for arson occurring on April 16, 1894. The indictments were ordered consolidated,
and all defendants were tried together and convicted. The Supreme Court reversed
this conviction because the indictments charged separate offenses independent of
each other. The Government argued that the record contained nothing to indicate
that the three defendants who had been charged in all counts had in fact been prejudiced by the joinder. It was in response to this contention that the Supreme Court
replied as quoted in text.
59. Id. at 81.
60. Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 570 (4th Cir. 1959). A finding of
prejudice from the very fact of misjoinder is, of course, central to the question
whether such error is harmless. Later cases turn on just that question. McElroy and
the per se rationale are cited for the proposition that the harmless error rule should
not apply to cases of misjoinder by virtually all the circuits so holding. United States
v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d
1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976); Graci v. United States, 504 F.2d 411, 413-14 (3d Cir.
1974); Chubet v. United States, 414 F.2d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Spector, 326 F.2d 345, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1963). See United States v. Eagleston, 417
F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1969); King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966).
61. The reference to "mass trials" is taken from Judge Holtzoff's opinion in
United States v. Walsh, 15 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D.D.C. 1953).
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The rule against jointly indicting and trying different defendants
for unconnected offenses is a long-established procedural safeguard. Its purpose is to prohibit exactly what was done here,
namely, allowing evidence in a case against one defendant to be
presented in the case against another charged with a completely
disassociated offense, with the danger that the jury might feel
that the evidence against the one supported the charge against
the other. It is not 'harmless error' to violate 6a' 2 fundamental procedural rule designed to prevent "mass trials. "
Seven years after Ingram, the First Circuit in King v. United
States63 put forward an expanded rationale for the per se rule.
King was tried and convicted with his codefendant on two counts of
a four-count consolidated indictment charging narcotics violations.
His codefendant had been charged alone in the remaining two
counts. As these counts charged similar but unrelated offenses to
those in which the defendants had been jointly charged, the court
of appeals found that they were not part of the "same series of acts
or transactions" and therefore, that they had been misjoined under
64
rule 8(b).
Writing for the First Circuit, Chief Judge Aldrich viewed
rule 8 as an attempt by the drafters to limit the degree of prejudice
to which they considered it tolerable to subject a defendant.6 5 This
limit represents a balancing of what Judge Aldrich called "a presumptive possibility of prejudice to the defendant, and of benefit
to the court."' 66 He suggested that any joinder of offenses or de67
fendants gives rise to this presumptive possibility of prejudice.
Joinder of offenses against one defendant involves prejudice because of the tendency of the jury to cumulate the offenses and convict the defendant as a "bad man." Judge Aldrich found that joinder of defendants involves an equal potential prejudice. Because
62.
supra.
63.

Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 570-71 (4th Cir. 1959). See note 61
355 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966).

64. Id. at 705. With regard to the court's determination of what constitutes a
"series," see text accompanying notes 126-166 infra.

65. King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966). Implicit in the
assertion that rule 8 sets the limits of tolerable prejudice is the argument that if its
purpose is not to set such limits, there is no purpose in the rule. Rule 14 would vest
all questions of joinder in the trial court. See note 14 supra. As both rule 14 and rule

8 were included in the rules, rule 8 must have been intended to establish the outer
bounds within which the trial court has discretionary power under rule 14.
66. King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966).
67. Id. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
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of what he described as "the natural tendency to infer guilt by
association," a defendant may suffer by joinder with another allegedly "bad man." 68
He recognized that in many cases, the criminal acts or associations which would cause prejudice to a defendant at a joint trial
would be admissible at separate trials, either as similar act evidence or as evidence of the defendant's association with certain
individuals. 69 Rule 8(b), Judge Aldrich suggested, not only includes
such cases but establishes a balance which goes beyond: "Rule 8(b)
is not limited to situations in which proof of the other criminal
transaction would be admissible in a separate trial. It goes beyond,
to others, the excuse being benefit to the court. "70 This benefit the
judge described as the judicial economy to be derived from joint
proof. However, where there is no apparent benefit, he concluded,
the balance tips toward protecting the defendant from possible prejudice: "Where . . . there are no presumptive benefits from joint
proof of facts relevant to all the acts or transactions, . . joinder is

impermissible."71
It should be noted that where there is no apparent benefit and
the balance gives way to presumptive prejudice to defendant, that
presumption is conclusive. While finding actual prejudice to the
defendant, the court emphasized that such a finding was not necessary to the result reached in the case. As the offenses on the other
dates did not constitute parts of the same "series" of acts or transactions, the initial joinder was improper as a matter of law and
defendant was entitled to a new trial. 72
The Second Circuit in United States v. Granello73 was the first

to break with the Ingram and King decisions and apply rule 52(a)
to misjoinder under rule 8. Granello involved consolidation for

68. King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704 (1st Cir. 1966).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
72. Id. at 705. Finding that the presumption of prejudice is conclusive must
rest on one of two grounds. It can be based on a recognition of the impossibility of
determining that defendant was not prejudiced by misjoinder, i.e., that his "substantial rights" (in the language of rule 52(a)) were not affected, or, it can be grounded
on a recognition that there will always be an unacceptable level of prejudice once
the bounds of rule 8 are crossed. The cases indicate support for both positions. As to
the former, see Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959); McElroy v.
United States, 164 U.S. 76 (1896). As to the latter, see Cupo v. United States, 359
F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
73. 365 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967).
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trial of counts against two defendants, Granello and Levine, initially contained in a five-count information and a three-count indictment. 74 Counts one and two of the information charged Granello with failure to file income tax returns in 1956 and 1957, despite the receipt of gross income of approximately $100,000 in each
of those years. Counts three and four alleged similar offenses against
Levine. Count five charged Granello, Levine, and a third defendant
with conspiracy to commit the substantive violations contained in
counts one through four. The indictment charged Levine in one
count and Granello in another with attempting to evade taxes for
1957. The third count charged the two with conspiracy to defraud
the United States and impeding the lawful functions of the Treasury Department by concealing the sources of their income and the
nature of their business activities. The information and indictment
were consolidated by consent. The two conspiracy counts were
dismissed at trial on the Government's motion. The trial resulted
in a hung jury on the substantive counts and a mistrial was declared. 75 The case was reassigned; the substantive offenses were
recharged, but with the conspiracy counts absent. Granello's motion for severance was denied. At the second trial, defendants were
convicted on each of the two substantive counts of the informa76
tion.
On appeal, the Second Circuit dealt extensively with whether
joinder was proper absent the conspiracy counts. 77 However, the
court avoided reaching a final decision on this question by finding
that even if defendants were in fact misjoined, the error was harmless. 78 Ingram was distinguished by the court as having involved

offenses "in no way connected." 79 McElroy, relied on by the Ingram court, was found inapplicable because it concerned "distinct
and independent transactions."' 0
The court in Granello cited the Supreme Court's decision in
74. Id. at 991.
75. Id. at 991-92.
76. Id. at 992.
77. The court was unconvinced that joinder was proper without the conspiracy
counts, id. at 993-94, but suggested that dismissal of those counts may not have been
on the merits. In that event, if double jeopardy rather than collateral estoppel were
the sole bar to sending the conspiracy charge to a second jury, a court could still look
to the conspiracy charge in the initial indictment or information to justify joinder
under rule 8(b). Id. at 995. However, the court ultimately avoided the question by
assuming misjoinder and finding that defendants were not prejudiced by it. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 570 (4th Cir. 1959)).
80. Id. (quoting McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 81 (1896)).
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Schaffer v. United States8 1 as implying "that the harmless error
rule is applicable to questions of improper joinder when it observed that the rule was not reached there because 'the joinder was
proper under Rule 8(b)' and no error was shown."-82 Finding that
the jury had been carefully instructed and that the Government
could have proved at separate trials that both Granello and Levine
had acquired income, the court concluded "no prejudice from the
'8 3
joinder could have occurred."
The implication drawn by the Second Circuit from Schaffer,
that the harmless error rule applies to questions of improper joinder, is not illogical. However, further analysis suggests that it is
not the only, or even necessarily the correct, implication to be
drawn.
The Supreme Court in Schaffer dealt with multiple defendants
brought to trial for offenses only properly joined by the inclusion of
a conspiracy count in the indictment. At the close of the Government's case, the conspiracy count was dismissed for failure of proof.
The defendants immediately moved for dismissal of the substantive
counts for misjoinder. The motions were denied on the ground that
joinder was not prejudicial. The case was appealed and ultimately
the Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, the Court stated that the
issue of harmless error was not reached in the case since the initial
joinder, prior to the dismissal of the conspiracy count, was proper
under rule 8(b). 84 Consequently, the Court viewed the case purely
in terms of whether there had been an abuse of discretion by the
trial judge in denying the defendants' motion to sever under rule
14. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that no prejudice had been
found by the trial court or by the court of appeals and "[w]e cannot
say to the contrary on this record." 8 5
The inference which the Granello court drew from the Schaffer
decision, that harmless error applies to misjoinder, is appealing because to argue against it appears to assert that an error can affect
"substantial rights" under rule 52(a) and yet not constitute an abuse
of discretion by the trial court under rule 14.86 However, this in81.

362 U.S. 511 (1960).

82. United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1019 (1967).
83. Id.
84. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 517 (1960).
85. Id. at 516.
86. For error not to be harmless under rule 52(a), it must affect substantial
rights. Difficult as the abuse of discretion standard of review is to meet, certainly an
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ference ignores the major rationale for finding prejudice per se
once misjoinder is established-the indeterminability of the resulting prejudice. The Supreme Court in Schaffer examined joinder under rule 14, not under rule 8. Arguably, the Court found
itself incapable of determining the extent to which defendants had
been prejudiced by joinder. Consequently, the Court was unable
to find an abuse of the trial court's discretion under rule 14.87 Had
it found joinder initially improper under rule 8, that same inability to determine the extent of the resulting prejudice might well
have led the Court to reject application of the harmless error rule,
as a majority of the courts of appeals have done. 88
Thus, while the inference drawn by the Granello court from
Schaffer may be quite logical, that an equally plausible and contrary inference can also be drawn from Schaffer indicates that the
Granello court's reliance on Schaffer may well be misplaced.
Moreover, it may be that the opposite conclusion should have been
drawn from that reached by the Granello court. It has been
suggested that in disposing of the appeal in a manner which managed to avoid consideration of the harmless error rule, the Schaffer
majority implicitly recognized that misjoinder under rule 8 was
prejudicial per se.8 9
Regardless of any implication to be drawn from Schaffer, in
distinguishing Ingram and McElroy, the Granello court failed even
to address the indeterminability argument. The court indicated
merely that the same evidence would have been admissible at separate trials as was presented at the joint one. However, while this
"same evidence" test is a major rationale for applying the harmless error rule, it leaves important questions unanswered, principally those raised by the indeterminability issue.
As Granello illustrates, the circuits which apply rule 52(a) to
find a particular misjoinder harmless rely heavily on the fact that
had separate trials been granted, virtually the same evidence offered to prove the charge that should have been severed would,
error affecting substantial rights must be held such an abuse.
87. The Court in Schaffer stated: "Nor can we fashion a hard-and-fast formula
that, when a conspiracy count fails, joinder is error as a matter of law." Schaffer v.
United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960). However, joinder might still have been proper
initially if the offenses had been part of the same series of acts or transactions.
88. See, e.g., Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959). See text
accompanying notes 57-59 supra. For a general description of the split between the
circuits and an indication of where the various courts of appeals stand on the issue,
see note 5 supra.
89.

8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

8.06[3], at 8-41 n.51 (2d rev. ed. 1977).
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nevertheless, have been admissible at a separate trial of the offense
with which it was initially misjoined. 90 Several recent cases demonstrate not only the application of this "same evidence" rationale
but some of the rationale's inherent problems.
In United States v. Turbide,9 1 decided in June 1977 by the

Second Circuit, defendants Turbide and Perez were charged in a
two-count indictment. Count one charged Turbide alone with possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine on July
17, 1974. Count two charged both Turbide and Perez with distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine on February 18, 1975. Perez moved to sever the two counts. This motion
was denied and Turbide was found guilty on count one. Both defendants were convicted on count two. Perez appealed claiming
misjoinder under rule 8(b). The court of appeals found that even
had severance been granted, "similar act" evidence with appropriate limiting instructions would still have been admissible against
Turbide at a joint trial of Turbide and Perez on count two. 92 As

"appropriate" limiting instructions had been given at trial, the
court, citing Granello, held that "no prejudice from the joinder of
offenses per se could have occurred." 93 Moreover, "any error arising from misjoinder was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."-9 4
Initially, it must be observed that the court's reliance on Granello was misplaced. The Granello court attempted to avoid the indeterminability question raised by Ingram and McElroy by distinguishing both those cases as involving offenses "in no way connected"
and "distinct and independent transactions." 95 Yet, "offenses in
no way connected" and "distinct and independent transactions"
90. See cases cited note 5 supra (applying rule 52 (a) to joinder improper under
rule 8).
91. 558 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
92. Id. at 1061-62.
93. Id. at 1062.
94. Id. at 1063.
95. United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1019 (1967). Despite the Granello court's efforts to avoid the problem by
distinguishing Ingram and McElroy, the inability of courts to determine the prejudice resulting from misjoinder remains an issue in Granello-type situations. See text
accompanying notes 99-120 infra. This is so even in cases where exactly the same
evidence would have come in at joint or separate trials. The demeanor of codefendants and their counsel at the joint trial and the absence of both had severance been
granted are important factors in determining the prejudice to which an objecting
defendant was exposed by misjoinder. Yet, the extent of such prejudice is incapable
of determination. See text accompanying notes 112-120 infra (discussing United
States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974)).
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were precisely what were involved in Turbide. Consequently, the
Turbide court relied on a decision which had distinguished precisely the facts of Turbide.
Second, if joinder of what are only similar acts, as in Turbide, is harmless error, this construes rule 8(a) in conjunction with
8(b) as a matter of law. The Second Circuit ostensibly rejected this
construction of rule 8 in Granello9 6 and again in Turbide.97 However, the "same evidence" rationale, adopted in Granello and followed in Turbide, can predicate no other result. Trial courts will
have no incentive to read rules 8(a) and 8(b) separately, but rather
will have a strong interest, based on economy and encouraged by
appellate acceptance, to read them together: The concern of the
Ingram court with "mass trials" 98 does not seem ill-founded.
The major problem inherent in the "same evidence" test is that
it is underinclusive. Its premise is that evidence presented at the
joint trial would be admissible at separate trials under rule 404(b)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 However, in the Turbide situation, it is unlikely that all evidence of the misjoined solo offense
presented against one defendant but not against the other at their
joint trial would be admissible at a separate trial of the joint offense.' 0 0 For example, had a severance of counts one and two been
granted in Turbide, it is unlikely that all evidence of the July 1974
transaction (count one) which was presented against Turbide at the
joint trial of both counts would have been admissible at a separate
trial of Turbide and Perez on the February 1975 transaction (count
two). Evidence of the July 1974 transaction could have been offered only to show motive, intent, or knowledge 10 ' on the part of
Turbide with respect to the February 1975 transaction. It could not
have been offered as proof on the merits of the July 1974 transac-

96. United States v. Granello, 365 U.S. 990, 993 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1019 (1967).
97. United States v. Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053, 1061 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S.Ct. 421 (1977).
98. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
99. FED. R. EviD. 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
100. If the severance were of defendants rather than of offenses, the evidence
would have no relevance and would not be admissible at all.
101. See note 99 supra.
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tion itself. Consequently, as detailed proof of count one as would
be presented at a trial on the merits of that charge would likely be
10 2
barred as overly prejudicial or collateral.
This reasoning was recognized by the Ninth Circuit shortly before Turbide in United States v. Satterfield,10 3 where the court rejected the "same evidence" rationale. In Satterfield defendants Satterfield and Merriweather were joined in a single indictment. The
charges related to five bank robberies committed in the same area
within a three-month period. The indictment charged that Merriweather alone had committed the first, second, and fifth robberies, and that Merriweather and Satterfield had together committed the third and the fourth. It was never alleged that Satterfield
was involved in the first, second, or fifth robberies, as a participant
in a series of acts or transactions, a coconspirator or in any other
manner. Satterfield's motions for a separate trial were denied; both
04
defendants were convicted as charged.
Satterfield appealed claiming misjoinder. The Government
argued, as the Second Circuit held in Turbide, that because evidence of all charges would have been admissible in a trial limited
to the crimes in which both defendants allegedly participated, the
convictions should stand.
Holding this reasoning unpersuasive, 10 5 Judge Kennedy
pointed out that evidence offered to prove an offense on the merits
will "generally be more extensive, and thus more damaging, than
that which would be adduced to establish a prior crime as proof of
such matters as motive or intent."106 In addition, the court in Satteifteld found it important that
where evidence of prior criminal acts is proffered, the trial court
has discretion to limit, or even to exclude, such evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

102. The probative value of the evidence not offered on the merits is much
more likely to be "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice to
both defendants. See FED. R. EVID. 403; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185, at 438-39

(2d ed. 1972).
103. 548 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1977).
104. Id. at 1343.
105. Id. at 1346.
106. Id. While Judge Kennedy's remarks were directed toward showing that
Satterfield had in fact been prejudiced by the joint trial, they apply equally to a
discussion of the "same evidence" rationale.
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presentation of cumulative evidence . . . .Where multiple offenses are charged in an indictment, however, a trial judge must
permit the prosecution
to establish each of those offenses beyond
10 7
a reasonable doubt.
The Ninth Circuit had previously found rule 52(a) applicable
to misjoinder under rule 8.108 The court in Satterfield did not
explicitly break from its prior decisions. However, the language and
reasoning of the opinion, as well as the court's finding that Satterfield was prejudiced by being misjoined, indicate that the court
may now be questioning its previous position.
In sum, in any case in which the "same evidence" rationale is
underinclusive, the defendant is subjected to a degree of prejudice
at a joint trial which would not have been present had severance
been granted. Even if all that can be said of the rationale is that
it is generally, but not always, underinclusive, it is inescapable that
in cases where the rationale is underinclusive, the courts' ability to
determine the resulting prejudice is once again an issue. To dismiss the question by flat statements that "no prejudice . . .could
have occurred" 10 9 indicates a flawed analysis, or worse, a callous
disingenuousness if the courts are deliberately ignoring this issue.
Even assuming that in a given case the "same evidence"
rationale is not underinclusive, that is, that precisely the same evidence would have been admitted at a trial of the severed count as
was admitted at the joint trial, further questions are raised. The
court in Turbide, for example, assumed that had severance been
granted, it would have been of offenses rather than of defendants:1 10
Turbide and Perez would have been tried jointly for the February
1975 transaction, the offense in which both allegedly participated;
Turbide would have been tried separately for the July 1974 offense.
Yet, if we accept as a premise that all evidence of Turbide's solo
transaction of July 1974 which was adduced at the joint trial would
have been admissible at a separate trial of the joint February 1975
offense, then, although having to prove the February 1975 transaction only once, the Government would have to prove the July
1974 transaction twice. But if the Government must prove one of
107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 924 (1971).
109. United States v. Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053, 1062 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 421 (1977).
110. See id.
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the offenses twice in any event, the offense proved twice should be
the joint one: Rather than severing offenses, there should be severance of defendants. This would significantly lessen the prejudice to
which defendants would be exposed without substantial sacrifice of
economy. 11 The Government would still have to prove one offense
twice, but, by severing defendants rather than offenses, the defendant who was charged only in the joint offense (Perez in the Turbide case) would avoid the cumulative prejudice of a trial of multiple offenses and defendants. The defendant charged with both the
joint and solo offenses would face the prejudice inherent in joinder
of similar offenses, permitted by rule 8(a), but would be spared the
additional prejudice of a trial of multiple defendants.
The implications of severing defendants rather than offenses
for the "same evidence" rationale are apparent. In cases where the
rationale can be applied, it should not be. There should be a severance of defendants, creating a situation in which the rationale
would have no application.
The "same evidence" rationale is equally subject to attack
where the effect of severance, whether of offenses or of defendants,
would be to try one of the defendants in a separate trial either
alone or with fewer defendants than at the initial joint trial. Assuming again that the "same evidence" would be admitted at a separate
trial as was admitted at the joint trial, the defendant would still experience a substantially different trial if granted severance. The trier
of fact would not only view fewer defendants and attorneys, but the
demeanor of codefendants and their lawyers would be absent as
111. It seems that it is the complexity of the facts, rather than the number of
defendants, which will determine whether proof of a joint offense will require more
or less time than proof of a solo offense. Proof of a joint offense is not inherently
more time-consuming. Moreover, given the benefit to both defendants of avoiding
prejudice, it would seem that in cases of misjoinder, the court should be precluded
from justifying severance of offenses rather than of defendants based on the complexity of a given fact situation. In cases where the number of joint offenses exceeds the
number of solo offenses, arguments for judicial economy will cut against severance of
defendants. It is virtually inconceivable, however, that in such cases all the evidence of the solo offense would have been permitted at a separate trial of the joint
offenses. Given the degree of prejudice already present in a trial of multiple defendants and multiple offenses, an offer of proof of the solo offense as complete as
permitted on the merits would be barred as overly prejudicial under FED. R. Evm.
403. Note, too, that in the Turbide situation prejudice can be potentially avoided by
trying the defendant charged with the solo offense first, alone, on that offense. If he
is acquitted, double jeopardy will bar evidence of the solo offense at a subsequent
joint trial of both defendants on the joint offense. However, conviction on the solo
offense should still give rise to severance of defendants.
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well. Viewed in terms of possible prejudice, this is prejudice which
would not have been present had severance been granted; the effect of this prejudice is necessarily indeterminable by an appellate
court. Yet, courts relying on the "same evidence" rationale have
consistently ignored this question.
Illustrative is the decision by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Weiss. 112 Defendants Leon Weiss, his wife, Ethel Weiss,
Melco International, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, Melco
International, Ltd., were charged in a nineteen-count indictment
with submitting false invoices and documents to the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service of the Department of Defense; defendants
were also charged with conspiracy to commit these offenses and
mail fraud in furtherance of this scheme (counts one through eighteen). Ethel Weiss was charged only in count nineteen. Count
nineteen charged her and her husband with obstruction of justice
by failing to produce documents subpoenaed by the grand jury investigating the scheme. Defendants were convicted on all counts.
Ethel Weiss appealed, claiming among other errors that she had
been improperly joined. 113 The key question was whether she
had participated in the "same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses." 114 However, the court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide this "difficult question" on the
ground that the Government would have been allowed to introduce "most if not all" of the proof put in at trial had she been tried
separately; thus, any error was without prejudice."15
In reaching its decision, the court entirely ignored the prejudice arising from the demeanor of both the codefendants with
whom she was tried and their lawyers. In the Weiss trial, this factor was important. Evidently, the feelings of the defense attorneys
and the judge for one another were neither complimentary nor left
unexpressed. The judge threatened on more than one occasion to
hold counsel in contempt of court and indeed did order one defense attorney to be held in contempt, 116 although this order was
later vacated. The court of appeals found that "[m]any of the trial
judge's comments, characterizations, and castigations of counsel
would have been better left unexpressed, since they not only failed
to serve any useful purpose but raised serious doubts as to the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
Id. at 462.
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
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court's impartiality and judicial detachment.' ' 1 17 Nevertheless, the
trial judge's conduct was excused for the most part as "only human. [Judges] do not possess limitless ability, once passion is
aroused, to resist provocation."" 8
While the court examined the trial at length in its opinion, it
did so in the context of whether prejudicial conduct on the part of
the trial judge denied all defendants a fair trial, not in the context
of possible prejudice to Ethel Weiss from improper joinder. The
inability to determine the prejudicial effect that the demeanor of
the codefendants and their counsel had had upon the jury was
ignored by the court: The issue was never considered in concluding that any error of misjoinder had been without prejudice. 1 19
This inability was poignantly, albeit inadvertantly, illustrated in the
opinion by the Second Circuit when it stated in a footnote: "[W]e
have no way, absent videotape and sound recording, of appraising
appellants' statement that 'no trial day was completely free from
shouting or near shouting . ... ' "120
The problems outlined above indicate the major difficulties
with application of rule 52(a) to misjoinder. These difficulties are
not lessened by the courts' refusal to go beyond simply labelling
their result "harmless error" and to address the real issue: whether
"substantial rights" are affected by misjoinder.
Courts, such as the Second Circuit in Granello and Turbide,
which base their application of rule 52(a) on a finding that "no prejudice from the joinder could have occurred,"121 are simply incorrect. Misjoined defendants are always subject to prejudice beyond
22
that to which they would otherwise have been exposed. 1
Several other courts applying rule 52(a) use less absolute language. These courts employ phrases such as "it is difficult to
see" 12 3 that the defendant was prejudiced or "[w]e think it highly
117. Id. at 468.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 467.
120. Id. at 468 n.2.
121. This phrase appears in both United States v. Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053, 1062
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977), and United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d
990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967). See also Baker v. United
States, 401 F.2d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
122. When courts state "no prejudice could have occurred," they are referring
to additional prejudice to defendant beyond that permitted by rule 8. See King v.
United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704 (1st Cir. 1966).
123. See United States v. Payden, 536 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 923 (1976); See also United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
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unlikely" 12 4 that the prejudice affected the verdict. Yet, these
courts, too, appear subject to criticism because such phrases dismiss
the question too easily. If the defendant is prejudiced, but the extent of the prejudice is indeterminable, this should be addressed
as a threshold matter before a decision as to "whether the error itself had substantial influence" 125 is reached. Given a defendant facing imprisonment because of the possibly substantial effect of his
misjoinder, that these courts have not dealt with a major variable
in the logic of their argument renders their conclusion uncertain
if not invalid.
THE BROADENING OF RULE 8

While many of the provisions of rule 8 contain terms of flexible meaning, 126 the one which has given courts the greatest opportunity for liberal joinder is the phrase "series of acts or transactions."' 127 Perhaps the seminal definition of "series" in this context
was that put forth by the First Circuit in King v. United States.' 28
Defendant King and his codefendant McKenney were jointly indicted on two counts of narcotics violations. Each count alleged a
separate transaction, each in violation of the same statute and on
the same date. A second indictment, in which McKenney alone
was charged, was consolidated with the first one for trial. The second indictment charged McKenney with identical violations of the
statute occurring on two other occasions. King was convicted and
appealed, challenging the joinder under rule 8 of the charges
against him with the charges against McKenney contained in the
1 29
second indictment.

Correctly analyzing the joinder under rule 8(b), the court concluded that the counts were properly joined only if the transactions
124. See United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert, de-

nied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971).
125. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).
126. The treatment of the word "transaction" by the Fourth Circuit in Cataneo
v. United States, 167 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1948), is illustrative: "[A]n interpretation of
the word 'transaction' frequently involves the balancing of conflicting interests: (1)
speed, efficiency and convenience in the functioning of the federal judicial machinery; against (2) the right of the accused to a fair trial ....
Id. at 823.
127. See, e.g., Scheve v. United States, 184 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Joinder
of one count charging three defendants with keeping a gaming table with a second
and third count charging one of their number with assault with intent to kill and
assault with a deadly weapon was upheld as part of the "same series of acts or transactions." Id. at 696.
128. 355 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966). For discussion of this case in the context of
prejudice per se resulting from misjoinder, see text accompanying notes 63-72 supra.
129. King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 702-03 (1st Cir. 1966).
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alleged were part of the same "series" under the rule. 130 Writing
for the court, Chief Judge Aldrich defined "series" in terms of the
benefits derived by the court from joinder in a particular case:
Rule 8(b) is not limited to situations in which proof of the other
criminal transaction would be admissible in a separate trial. It
goes beyond, to others, the excuse being the benefit to the court.
:

. .

[T]his possibility of benefit should explicitly appear from the

indictment or from other representations by the government before trial. Classic examples of such a benefit are when there is an
overlapping of issues, as, for example, when some defendants are
charged with transporting stolen goods in interstate commerce,
and others are charged with receiving the goods, so stolen and
transported .

.

. or when defendants are charged with conspir-

acy to conceal a crime that part of their number are charged
with committing .

.

.

. Where, however, there are no pre-

sumptive benefits from joint proof of facts relevant to all the acts
or transactions, there is no "series," Rule 8(b) comes to an end,
and joinder is impermissible. 131
Applying this test to the facts in King, the court found no
"series.' 132 Consequently, the counts contained in the second in133
dictment were held to have been misjoined.
The King test for "series" can be construed to permit quite liber13 5
al joinder. 134 Yet, several courts seem to be expanding its scope.
130. Id. at 703.
131. Id. at 704 (citations and footnote omitted). The statement: "Rule 8(b) is not
limited to situations in which proof of the other criminal transaction would be admissible in a separate trial," id., is somewhat misleading. It implies that rule 8(b) permits joinder of similar acts, acts proof of which is more likely to be admissible in a
separate trial than is proof of dissimilar acts. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). However, the
rule does not permit such joinder unless the acts are part of the same transaction or
series of transactions. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 supra. The court in King
declares this elsewhere in the opinion: "A 'series' is something more than mere
'similar acts.'" King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966). Evidently, the
court meant only to suggest that rule 8 permits even dissimilar acts or transactions to
be joined simply by virtue of being in the same series. It is the joinder of such dissimilar acts which Chief Judge Aldrich finds a presumptively less appropriate basis
for joinder than "similar acts," id. at 704, and which is justified only by an explicit
appearance of benefit to the court.
132. King v. United States, 355 U.S. 700, 705 (1st Cir. 1966).
133. Id.
134. The court, for example, failed to indicate how much benefit to the court
must appear before a "series" can be discerned. The court intended that the "presumptive benefits" from joinder be more than simply an increased likelihood of conviction; otherwise, the court would not have reached the result it did. The test requires that for joint proof to be a presumptive benefit, it must relate to all the acts or
transactions. Id. at 704.
135. But see United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1969) (ex-
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In Haggardv. United States,' 36 decided shortly after King, the
Eighth Circuit moved considerably beyond King in finding transactions part of a series. Haggard, a banker, was alleged to have set
up a number of loans to fictitious borrowers, defendants Martin
and Sewell. In addition, he was alleged to have backed a scheme
by which the bank discounted fictitious notes owed to a used car
dealership run by defendant Alley. Either Alley or another defendant, Barnes, would cash the checks he received from the bank on
the discounted notes. Haggard would receive a kickback. A large
amount of money went into his own pocket with the balance going
to the defendants who participated in each scheme. Haggard was
charged with a total of five other defendants. The indictment was
in fourteen counts. Counts thirteen and fourteen, involving Haggard and the fifth defendant, were severed prior to trial. Count one
charged Haggard, Alley, and Barnes with conspiracy, but did not
charge Martin and Sewell.1 37 The remaining counts charged the
substantive offenses outlined above. Haggard was charged in each
count. Alley and Barnes were not charged in any counts with Martin and Sewell and were not charged in the fictitious loan counts.
Martin and Sewell were not charged in the counts involving the
discounting scheme. The indictment alleged no common scheme,
plan, or series of transactions involving Alley with Martin or
Sewell. The defendants were each found guilty on at least one
38
count. Alley appealed, claiming misjoinder under rule 8(b).1
The court correctly stated the issue as whether Alley had participated in the same series of transactions as that involving the
offenses of Martin and Sewell. However, the court found that the
indictment demonstrated: (a) a common participant throughout all
tremely narrow construction of "series"). Eagleston, codefendant Faubian, and an
informer were alleged to have stolen a car, crossed from Oklahoma to Missouri and

broken into a ladies' garment store. Faubian and the informer stole a truck, which all
three loaded with the stolen women's clothing. They then returned to Oklahoma,
driving the stolen car. Faubian and Eagleston were jointly indicted and charged in
two counts with transportation of a stolen vehicle (the car) and transportation of stolen goods in interstate commerce. Id. at 13. Eagleston was charged alone in a third
count with transportation of a stolen vehicle (the truck) in interstate commerce. Id.
Under even a restricted reading of the King test, it seems that the alleged transac-

tions should have been found part of the same series. However, the court in Eagleston
declined to do so, finding that the offenses were "totally unrelated," that Faubian
had "participated" only in counts two and three, and that therefore, there had been
a misjoinder of defendants. Id. at 14.
136. 369 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1966).
137. Id. at 971.
138. Id. at 971-73.
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counts, (b) a similar scheme to defraud the same bank in all counts,
(c) identical transactions in each instance, 139 (d) the occurrence of
all offenses within the time alleged in the conspiracy count of
Alley and the others, 140 and (e) the defendants as "aiders and abettors" to the common participant.14 1 The court of appeals then concluded that "[lulnder these circumstances one can imply a 'clear
discernible pattern of action' involving Haggard and his accomplices in the 'same series of acts or transactions,'"142 and therefore joinder was proper. Writing for the court, Judge Lay formalized this into the following test: "If the indictment invites 'joint
proof'

.

. . or infers a common pattern of action, prima facie

joinder is shown."' 143 The court thus expanded upon King by permitting a finding of "series" by implication from merely similar acts
linked by a common participant.
The Eighth Circuit appears to have reaffirmed this position in
its most recent decision in this area, United States v. Roell,'"4
decided more than seven years after Haggard. The facts in Roell
were remarkably similar to those in King, where the First Circuit
found joinder improper.' 45 The two defendants, Roell and Manning, were charged in two counts of the four-count indictment
with possession and sale of cocaine on September 22, 1972. Roell
was charged alone in the remaining two counts with possession
and sale of cocaine on a date three days after the sale alleged in the
first two counts. No conspiracy was charged. Defendants were found
guilty on all counts and Roell and Manning appealed, claiming error
146
by the trial court in joining them in a single trial for both sales.
The Eighth Circuit rejected this contention. The court found that
the joinder had been proper, stating: "It is clear that Roell and
Manning were involved in the same transaction on September 22,
1972 .... This is enough to satisfy Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure."' 147 As in Haggard, the court thus permitted

139. The court somehow found the false loan applications and the forged notes
in the discounting scheme "identical transactions." Id. at 974.
140. The conspiracy count did not, however, include either Sewell or Martin.
141. Haggard v. United States, 369 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1966) (footnotes
omitted).
142. Id. (citations omitted).
143. Id. (citing King v. United States, 335 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966)).
144. 487 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1973).
145. See text accompanying notes 128-133 supra.
146. United States v. Roell, 487 F.2d 395, 398 (8th Cir. 1973).
147. Id. at 402.
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joinder of what were merely similar offenses with a common
participant.
The test set forth in Haggard and followed in Roell is tantamount to reading rules 8(a) and 8(b) in tandem so long as"there is
a common participant in each count. As indicated above, the "same
rule 52(a) applicable
evidence" test, applied by the courts finding
148
to misjoinder, approaches the same result.
A test for "series" which has evolved in the Fifth Circuit has a
similar effect. Three cases indicate its development from a rough
application of the King test to a test which approaches the result in
Haggard: Tillman v. United States,149 United States v. Marionneaux, 150 and United States v. Levine. 151
The charges in Tillman stemmed from a protest against the
war in Vietnam at an Armed Forces Entry and Examination Station. Appellants Moore and Simmons were joined in one count of a
two-count indictment with four other defendants. The count
charged the six with willfully injuring government property. 152 A
second count charged the four other defendants, not including
Moore and Simmons, with interfering with administration of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act. 153 All defendants were

convicted and appealed claiming, among other errors, misjoinder
under rule 8.154
The Fifth Circuit, stating that rule 8(a) should be read in conjunction with rule 8(b), 155 found that "since it is apparent that the
offenses . . . arose out of a connected series of acts . . . there was

no error under rule 8(b) in trying the appellants together."156 Regardless of the meaning ascribed to "connected series of acts,"
which the court never defined, the decision in Tillman was at least
157
arguably within the bounds of the "series" test set forth in King.
148. See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.
149. 406 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1969).
150. 514 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).
151. 546 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1977).

152. A glass door which the demonstrators had pushed on had been damaged.
Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 933 (5th Cir. 1969).
153. The count alleged that defendants had attempted to prevent an inductee
from entering the induction center. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 934. The court in Tillman cited King. The court in King, however,

specifically stated: "Rule 8(b) is not to be implemented by Rule 8(a)." King v. United
States, 355 F.2d 700, 704 (1st Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
156. Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 934 (5th Cir. 1969).
157. Proof of facts surrounding the demonstration and its goals was relevant
to proof of the charges contained in both counts. Thus, the King requirement of
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Two further cases decided recently by the Fifth Circuit, while
ultimately finding defendants misjoined under rule 8(b), employed
a test for "series" which goes far beyond even a broad reading of
the King test. In United States v. Marionneaux158 and United
States v. Levine, 159 the Fifth Circuit defined the phrase "the same
series of acts or transactions" as "requiring a 'substantial identity of
facts or participants' between two offenses to make rule 8(b) joinder
proper." 160 In each case, the court ultimately found that the defendants had been misjoined. The significance of the cases, howLevine well
ever, lies in the test, not in the outcome. The facts in
1 61
"series."
for
test
new
this
of
implications
illustrate the
The seven defendants in Levine were charged in a five-count
indictment alleging interstate transportation of pornography. Count
one charged all defendants with conspiracy to commit the substantive offenses set out in the rest of the indictment. Counts two and
three charged four of the defendants with interstate transportation
of obscene film by common carrier and interstate transportation of
obscene film for sale and distribution. Counts four and five charged
three of these defendants, Levine, and another defendant, MPD
Films, with offenses identical to those alleged in counts two and
three, but arising from entirely different acts. Neither Levine nor
MPD Films was charged in counts two and three. Levine and
"presumptive benefits from joint proof of facts relevant to all the acts or transactions," King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704 (1st Cir, 1966), was arguably met.

For a case somewhat analogous to Tillman but reaching a different result based on a
much narrower reading of rule 8, see United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11 (10th
Cir. 1969). For a discussion of Eagleston, see note 135 supra.
158. 514 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).
159. 546 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1977).
160. Id. at 662 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Marionneaux, 514
F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1975)).
161. Levine is the most recent expression of the Fifth Circuit's "substantial
identity of facts or transactions" test. In United States v. Marionneaux, 514 F.2d
1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1975), a total of 11 defendants were joined in two counts of
a single indictment. Each count alleged a conspiracy to obstruct justice. Id. at 1248.
One defendant, Partin, was the only defendant common to each count. He was not
tried with the others. Id. at 1247. Defendants Hugh and Don Marionneaux were
named only in count one. Id. Defendants Sykes and Trantham were named only in
count two. Id. While each conspiracy had as its objective interference with the criminal prosecution of Partin, the prevention of the appearance of a different witness
was alleged as the goal of each conspiracy. Id. at 1247-48. Sykes, Trantham, and both
Marionneaux were convicted and appealed, claiming misjoinder. The Fifth Circuit
agreed and remanded defendants for a new trial. Id. at 1249. In finding the initial
joinder improper, however, the court enunciated the following test: "Where ...there
is no substantial identity of facts or participants between the two offenses, there is
no 'series' of acts under Rule 8(b)." Id.
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MPD Films were found guilty on counts one, four, and five. 16 2
They appealed claiming that they had been improperly joined. The
Fifth Circuit found that the conspiracy charge could not reasonably
have been made.1 63 Consequently, the court held that joinder had
indeed been improper because the original indictment did not
identity of facts
otherwise meet the test which requires "substantial
16 4
or participants" for a "series" to be found.
The importance of this test for "series" lies not in its requirement of substantial identity of facts, 165 but rather in that it is disjunctive. This permits a finding of "series" and, consequently,
proper joinder under rule 8(b) on a showing of substantial identity
of participants regardless of any connection between the acts and
transactions constituting offenses. This is not simply a reading of
rule 8(b) in conjunction with rule 8(a), provided the participants are
the same. This test goes beyond that simple reading and permits
joinder in multiple defendant cases of completely unrelated offenses. In Levine, for example, provided the participants charged
with each offense were "substantially" the same, 1 6 6 this would
have permitted joinder of all the substantive counts without a conspiracy count, an allegation of a common scheme, or an allegation
that the offenses stemmed from the same series of acts or transactions. Moreover, the offenses themselves need not even be similar
as they were in Levine. Provided that all, or substantially all, defendants were charged with each offense, Levine and his codefendants
could have been joined in one indictment with transporting obscene
films in interstate commerce as count one, and arson in count two,
although the offenses were totally unrelated.
As indicated, the test for "series" enunciated in Marionneaux
and Levine thus represents a substantial expansion of the King test.
The implications of this test for criminal defendants are apparent:
As the bounds of permissible joinder expand, there is a concomitant contraction in the number of situations in which questi6ns of

162. United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 661 (5th Cir. 1977).
163. Id. at 666.
164. Id. at 662.
165. The requirement of substantial identity of facts seems quite narrow, Indeed, it is arguably narrower in this respect than the King requirement that joint
proof be relevant to all acts or transactions in the series. The court in King did not
indicate the extent of joint proof which was required. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
166. Presumably, although "substantially" is not defined by the court, the test
does not even require complete identity of participants.
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misjoinder will arise. While appellants in circuits applying rule
52(a) may find claims of improper joinder dismissed as assertions of
harmless error, in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits at least, these
same appellants may find themselves without any error to assert.
CONCLUSION

The drafters of rule 8 intended the rule to delineate the limits
of permissible joinder in federal criminal cases. 1 67 A determination
of improper joinder is a finding that these limits have been overreached.
These boundaries should be recognized. Rule 52(a) is not an
acceptable substitute for firmly establishing them; neither can it
justify subjecting defendants to joinder beyond these limits.
The primary justification for applying rule 52(a) to cases of misjoinder, the "same evidence" rationale, does not provide sufficient
grounds for finding improper joinder to be harmless error. It is
inaccurate as a test for ascertaining the prejudice resulting from
misjoinder because of the impossibility of determining the extent
of that prejudice.' 68 Furthermore, the rationale is inherently inadequate because it fails to comprehend a second function of rule
1 69
8, the deterrence of "mass trials."
The implications of applying rule 52(a) to misjoinder have
been ignored by the courts. A finding of harmless error in cases of
i °
misjoinder, particularly in situations similar to that in Turbide, '
encourages reading rules 8(a) and 8(b) in tandem.' 7 ' If the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits indicate a trend, the circuits refusing to find
harmless error in cases of misjoinder may well be approaching the
same result by definitional expansion of the joinder rules.' 72 Ul17 3
timately, the result in both cases is broader permissible joinder.
167. King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966). The existence in
the Federal Rules of both rule 8 and rule 14 permits no other conclusion. See note
65 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 99-120 supra.
169. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
170. United States v. Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
421 (1977).
171. See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra. Consequently, the criticism
which has been directed at rule 8(a) seems equally applicable to the reading of rules
8(a) and 8(b) in conjunction. See text accompanying notes 19-28 supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 126-166 supra.
173. The effect of more liberal joinder is to increase the limits of prejudice to
which we as a society are willing to expose potential defendants. It is not persuasive
to raise the existence of rule 14 as a justification. Rule 14 has proved an ineffective
recourse from prejudicial joinder. See note 14 supra.
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To that extent, the gap between the circuits appears to be narrowing.
At issue, however, is not simply the effect of misapplication of
rule 8 or whether broad or narrow definition of that rule is appropriate, but rather the nature of the rule itself. It is arguable that
broadening permissible joinder, even to the point of reading rules
8(a) and 8(b) in conjunction with each other, is consistent with the
drafters' intent. 174 Yet, such a construction is contrary to the interpretation of the rule since its inception.' 7 5 If the fundamental
nature of the rule, as construed by the courts, is to be altered, that
alteration should be approached honestly and discussed openly: It
should not emerge cloaked in the guise of harmless error and creative definition.
Such an alteration would be regrettable. Our judicial system
already has its share of elements which present a defendant with inherently uncertain prospects for justice. It would be unfortunate
to increase the disadvantages which those who encounter the
system must face, particularly when the single justification for such
a development is judicial economy. Efficiency and economy are
attractive commodities; they are in scarce supply. Scarcity demands
higher prices, but when the cost is expanded joinder in criminal
1 76
cases, the price is too high.
Thomas C. Wales
174. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
175. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
176. The language employed by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), discussing the avoidance of mass trials, is equally appropriate here: "[T]his may be inconvenient for prosecution. But our Government is
not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every citizen, in

his being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding
criminal trials. About them we dare not become careless or complacent.
... Id.
at 773.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/2

32

